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I. Introduction
The twentieth anniversary of the publication of the United Nations 
Development Program Human Development Report in 1994 which introduced 
the concept of ‘human security’ to an international audience gives us an 
opportunity to reflect on its relevance to arguably a more unstable and insecure 
world. Its recent adoption by the United Nations General Assembly in September 
2012 (UN General Assembly, 2012) and its institutionalization through the 
United Nations system through the Trust Fund for Human Security, suggests that 
Human Security(2) has become part of the global mainstream, a central plank of 
the post-Cold War ‘liberal peace’(Richmond, 2005). The mainstreaming of 
Human Security, however, has come at a cost. Human Security has lost its 
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critical edge. It is argued that it has failed to contest the hegemony of the 
‘national security paradigm’ which continues to provide the dominant framework 
for ascertaining and dealing with security threats. Indeed, as the authors of the 
Commission for Human Security Report (2003) make clear, Human Security 
complements rather than challenges national security.
Where Human Security has made considerable inroads in providing an 
alternative to national security by qualifying state sovereignty has been in the 
formerly colonized world, particularly in post-conflict societies or transitional 
democracies, where fragile state structures, deep social cleavages, ethno-
religious militancy and pervasive socio-economic problems stemming from 
underdevelopment have posed challenges to the state’s very survival. In some 
cases, such as Afghanistan, Somalia, Southern Sudan, the Central African 
Republic, parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo and, most infamously, 
Rwanda, state structures have collapsed entirely leaving vulnerable populations 
at the mercy of external assistance. The proclivity of state elites to use violence 
against their own populations with impunity when faced with challenges to their 
own authority, such as in Libya and Syria has furthermore outraged conceptions 
of ‘civilized behaviour’ leading to demands for intervention.  The recent 
intervention against the so-called Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq is a case in 
point. Although not a fully functioning ‘state’ in a Westphalian sense, IS has— 
by unleashing a reign of terror against religious minorities (and Western aid 
workers)— ‘necessitated’ intervention by the international community. Human 
Security, as a key concept associated with liberal peacebuilding, has facilitated 
the intervention of the ‘international community’ in the internal affairs of ‘post-
conflict societies’ and governance of many areas of the ‘developing world.’ For 
some, this development is to be welcomed as part of a “civilizing process” 
which seeks to minimize violent harm and the unnecessary suffering of others. 
The “civilizing process” refers to the process whereby modern Europeans came 
to regard themselves as more ‘civilized’ than their ancestors and more 
‘developed’ than other peoples (Elias, 2000; Linklater, 2011, this issue). 
“Standards of civilization” (Gong, 1984) were a pre-condition for entry into 
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‘international society’ in the mid-nineteenth to early twentieth century and the 
“expansion of international society” (Bull and Watson, 1984) after the Second 
World War was predicated on the acceptance of ‘western’ notions of state 
sovereignty, rights and self-restraint as universal standards of civilization. 
Viewed from the perspective of many of those in the Global South, therefore, 
Human Security appears as merely the latest instalment of the ‘civilizing 
missions’ of the nineteenth century which served as a pretext for their 
colonization. 
However, does not the ideal of human security(3) —a world free from fear 
and want— remains a universal aspiration for ‘humanity’? Humanity, it is 
argued, cannot be assumed a priori but must be understood from within different 
cultural traditions. It is here that the role of religion and identity, as exemplified 
by the Arab Uprisings, plays an important role in permitting the articulation of 
different conceptions of human security in vernacular terms and re-embedding 
individuals deracinated by the pernicious effects of neo-liberal globalization and 
subject to repression by ‘secular’ authoritarian rule into ‘cultural’ communities. 
This article seeks to further contribute to the development of a ‘critical human 
security’ perspective (Shani and Pasha, 2007; Newman, 2010) by arguing that 
the project of human security can only be furthered in a multicultural world 
through a sustained engagement with the post-secular (Habermas, 2008). In my 
understanding a ‘post-secular’ conception of human security should seek to 
recognize the multiple religio-cultural contexts in which human dignity is 
embedded. For Jürgen Habermas, the term ‘post-secular’ refers to societies 
where the continued existence of religious communities in an increasingly 
secularized environment necessitates, on the one hand, the inclusion of religious-
based world-views into the public sphere, and, on the other, the translation of 
religious-based claims into secular terms in order to guarantee the neutrality of 
the public sphere. My own view is that translation is that the ‘translation’ of 
Human security in lower case opens up the possibility of conceptualizing ‘security’ from 
multiple culturally informed perspectives of which the cosmopolitan liberal tradition is merely 
one. 
(3)
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faith-based claims would result in their secularization and that therefore an 
attempt should be made to understand faith-based claims in their own terms.
It will, furthermore, be suggested that such a ‘post-secular conception’ of 
human security is more suited to an increasingly ‘post-western’ world where the 
rise of the BRICS and the resurgence of political Islam in particular constitute a 
powerful challenge to the main institutions and values of an ‘international 
society’ dominated by the West. Thirty years ago, Bull and Watson (1984, p. 
433) noted that ‘the most striking feature of international society…is the extent 
to which the states of Asia and Africa have embraced such basic elements of 
European international society as the sovereign state, the rules of international 
law, the procedures and conventions of diplomacy and IR’. Although the main 
values of international society, and the discipline of International Relations (IR), 
continue to be articulated in almost exclusively Eurocentric terms, the ‘revolt 
against the West’ particularly after 9/11 has created space for the return of 
religion and identity to IR. While a truly “post-western” theory of IR still awaits 
elucidation, the ‘secular’ values of international society and ontology of IR has 
been increasingly challenged by the global religious resurgence and a growing 
interest in the cognitive claims of ‘non-western’ cultural traditions (Shani, 
2008b). This makes a “post-western” approach to Human Security not only 
possible but imperative if it is to claim to be universal.
I. Human Security: The Contemporary Civilizing Mission?(4)
The notion of Human Security is premised on the assumption that the 
individual human being is the only irreducible focus for discourse on security. 
Consequently, the claims of all other referents, including the nation-state, derive 
from the sovereignty of the individual (MacFarlane and Khong, 2006, p. 2). 
While most advocates of Human Security agree that its primary goal should be 
the protection of individual human lives, they differ as to what the individual 
should be protected from. Conventionally a distinction is made between ‘narrow’ 
This section draws on Shani (2011, 2013b).(4)
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and ‘broad’ definitions. The first approach conceives of Human Security 
negatively, in terms of the absence of threats to the physical security or safety of 
individuals. This ‘narrow’ definition is exemplified in the Human Security 
Report which defines human security as the protection of individuals from 
“violent threats” (Human Security Report, 2005, 2011). Furthermore, the narrow 
approach also informs the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R to P) 
which was adopted  by the General Assembly after the World Summit in 2005 
and formed the pretext for United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 
1970 and 1971 which authorized the creation of a ‘no-fly zone’ over Libya in 
2011. According to paragraph 138 of the World Summit Outcome resolution, 
each “individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” through 
“the prevention of such crimes” (emphasis mine). Where states, such as Libya in 
2011 or presumably contemporary Syria, fail in their responsibility to protect the 
population under its legal authority, then, under paragraph 139, the ‘international 
community’ must assume that responsibility and must be prepared to “take 
collective action in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, 
in accordance with the Charter” (United Nations General Assembly, 2005). 
The second approach goes beyond a narrow focus on the responsibility of 
states to protect their citizens and posits a ‘broader’ conception of human 
security which takes into account “freedom from want, freedom from fear and 
freedom to take action on one's own behalf” (Commission on Human Security, 
2003). A broader approach to Human Security, one more in keeping with the 
spirit of the UNDP Report, emerged from the Commission on Human Security 
(CHS) which was headed by Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen and 
former UNCHR Head (and ICU professor) Sadako Ogata. The Final Report 
stated that the objective of Human Security was to protect “the vital core of all 
human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment” 
(Commission on Human Security 2003, 4). However, protection is seen as an 
insufficient condition to achieve Human Security: it should seek also to “to 
empower [people] to act on their own behalf” (Commission on Human Security 
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2003 –italics mine). This approach to Human Security appears to have 
influenced the recent resolution adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly (A/66/290) in September 2012 which sought to arrive at a “common 
understanding of human security”. The Resolution adopted defined Human 
Security as the “right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty 
and despair”. “All individuals”, it continued, “are entitled to freedom from fear 
and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and 
fully develop their human potential” (UN General Assembly, 2012).
The antinomy between the ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ approaches masks the 
discursive continuities between the two approaches which are reflected in the 
practices of international institutions committed to Human Security. Indeed, it 
could be argued that the fundamental difference between the two approaches is 
merely that what advocates of the ‘narrow’ approach assume to be a social 
fact —the atomized individual—proponents of the narrow approach consider a 
project: the creation of unencumbered individuals out of the culturally 
differentiated great mass of humanity. The ‘project’ of Human Security, in other 
words, entails not only the protection of, but also the construction of rational, 
autonomous and self-interested individuals out of the great culturally 
differentiated mass of humanity. As such, there are unmistakable continuities 
with the ‘civilizing mission’ of nineteenth century Imperialism which sought to 
actively impose a ‘cultural conversion of non-Western states to a Western 
civilizational standard’ (Hobson, 2012, p. 27, emphasis in the original).  The 
agents of the contemporary ‘civilizing mission’, however, are no longer 
European empires, private companies such as the East India Company or 
missionaries, but an ‘international community’ centred on the United Nations 
system dominated by powerful Western states (most of which were colonial 
Empires) working in tandem with multinational corporations and selected 
international non-governmental organizations to institutionalize liberal 
peacebuilding in ‘fragile’ post-colonial states. 
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II. Critical Human Security(5) 
The most persistent criticism of the concept of Human Security is that, in 
the words of Roland Paris, it tends “to be extraordinarily expansive and vague, 
encompassing everything from physical security to psychological well-being, 
which provides policymakers with little guidance in the prioritization of 
competing policy goals and academics little sense of what, exactly, is to be 
studied” (Paris, 2001, p. 88).  For political realists in particular, this broadening 
and deepening of the concept of security is pernicious in that it distracts states 
from their primary role in protecting the “national interest” from external threats. 
However, from a critical perspective it could be argued that the very ambiguity 
of the concept of Human Security makes it susceptible to incorporation into the 
very paradigm it is seeking to replace: the national security paradigm. Critical 
perspectives challenge the positivist assumptions of conventional approaches to 
security which they consider to be “problem-solving” theories designed to 
promote the smooth functioning of the international state-system (Cox, 1981). 
The national security paradigm is premised on the assumption that the state is 
simultaneously the main instrument of protection for the national community 
and the sole referent object of security discourse. As a sovereign entity, the state 
gets to decide on what constitutes the national interest and the means to pursue 
it. Human Security was initially proposed as an alternative to the national 
security paradigm yet it has failed to contest its hegemony within the theory and 
practice of international relations. Most of the issues it has raised have been 
incorporated as non-traditional security threats and the power of nation-states 
has remained undiminished. This can be seen in the UN General Assembly 
resolution (A/66/290) which categorically states that “Human Security does not 
replace State security” and that it is based instead on the principle of “national 
ownership”. On the one hand, Human Security is seen as a “peoples-centred 
approach” marking a significant departure in security studies since it makes the 
individual and not the sovereign nation-state as the primary referent object of 
(5) The following section appears in Shani (2013).
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security. Yet on the other hand, the concept of Human Security reinforces the 
doctrine of national security by re-empowering the state through capacity-
building so it can protect its populations from a plethora of existential threats, 
from militant transnational Islamic-based terrorism to contagious diseases such 
as Ebola. As MacFarlane and Khong (2006, p. 265) point out, Human Security 
is “not about transcending or marginalizing the state” but “about ensuring that 
states protect their people.” This gives rise to the concern, that Human Security 
may be sufficiently malleable to allow itself to be used to legitimize greater state 
control over society in the name of protection (Shani, 2007). Human Security, in 
short, has been “co-opted and incorporated into statist discourses” (Booth, 2005, 
p. 266).
Critically reworked, however, human security has the potential to contest 
the hegemony of the discourse on national security. Critical perspectives not 
only challenge the positivist assumptions of conventional approaches to security, 
but are also concerned with the possibilities for liberation that are immanent 
within existing political and social relations (Cox 1981, p. 128). In Booth’s 
words they engage in “immanent critique: the rejection of utopian blueprints in 
favour of the discovery of latent potentials on which to build political and social 
“progress”. The objective of critical theory is the “emancipation” of individuals 
from “structural oppression suffered on account of gender, class or race” (Booth, 
2005, p. 263).
Recently, Edward Newman has argued that a critical approach to Human 
Security should adopt the approach pioneered by the ‘Welsh School’ of Critical 
Security Studies (CSS) and focus on the emancipation of individuals (Newman, 
2010). CSS, as famously defined by Ken Booth, is an issue-area study, 
developed within the academic discipline of international politics, concerned 
with the pursuit of critical knowledge about security in world politics. Central to 
the CSS approach is the re-conceptualization of “security as emancipation”. 
Whilst “security” means “the absence of threats”, Booth defined emancipation 
as the “freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from the physical and 
human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose 
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to do”. CSS theorists follow Booth in viewing war, poverty, poor education and 
political oppression as constraints on “security”. Emancipation, they argue, “not 
power or order, produces true security” (Booth, 1991, p. 319). Re-
conceptualising security as emancipation, however, as Mustapha Kamal Pasha 
and I had previously argued, risks leading to a greater “securitization” of 
security; the generic attempt to simply expand the menu of security studies 
without recognizing the insurmountable difficulty of conceptual translation and 
transmission (Shani and Pasha, 2007). Adopting the idiom of the Copenhagen 
School, we suggested that critical human security should focus instead on de-
securitisation yet the excessive concentration of Copenhagen School theorists 
on the ways in which political issues become ‘de/securitised’ from above seem 
obscures the very real contributions which people make to the de-securitisation 
of their own lives (see Aradau, 2004; Balzacq, 2010; Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 
1998; Huysmans, 2006; Wæver, 1995). They do so, however, not as individuals 
but as part of collective communities with distinct but fluid cultures. 
In common with the conventional discourses on Human Security they are 
endeavouring to critique, both ‘Copenhagen’ and ‘Welsh’ theorists reproduce the 
modernist conception of the individual as “bare life” (Agamben, 1998).(6) 
Metaphorically denuded of the protective layering of culture through which 
individuals find meaning, dignity and ‘identity, the abstract individual of 
conventional Human Security discourse becomes a ‘docile body’ (Foucault, 
1991) to be subjected, used, transformed and empowered by the market. Culture 
here is not assumed as a ‘primordial attachment,’ an unchanging ethnic property 
of territorially-defined groups but is understood in a ‘thin sense’ as a framework 
through which individuals attain meaning and identity as part of a community. 
Culture is, in short, what gives us a bios: a life with dignity, endowed with 
meaning which can consequently be considered “worthy” of sacrifice (Agamben, 
(6) For Agamben, ‘bare life’ corresponds to the ancient Greek term zoe, which expresses the 
simple fact of living: bare life is life which can be killed but not yet sacrificed. This differed 
from the term bios which denoted a qualified life: a life with dignity, endowed with meaning 
which was consequently considered ‘worthy’ of sacrifice’ (Agamben, 1998).
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1998). Cultural difference does not stem from mutually irreconcilable core 
values which inevitably give rise to conflict as some prominent scholars have 
claimed (c.f. Huntington 1993, 1996), but must be accepted and understood in 
its own terms. Attempts to negate difference by assimilating ‘otherness’ to a 
universal ‘self’ are not only counterproductive but, it is argued, a fundamental 
source of insecurity. Universalistic conceptions of Human Security can 
themselves, therefore, be seen as a type of human insecurity.
III. De-Secularizing Human Security
The approach taken in this paper does not seek to reject Human Security as 
merely the latest technique of neo-colonial governmentality (Foucault, 2007) but 
seeks to reconceptualize it by taking into account cultural difference (Pasha, 
2013). In keeping with a broadly-defined critical approach which seeks not only 
to question assumptions but seeks possibilities for liberation that are immanent 
within existing political and social relations (Cox, 1981), it is argued that Human 
Security, if critically reworked, can pose a powerful immanent challenge to the 
hegemony of the national security paradigm by using the language of security to 
further the goals of emancipation from fear and want. In order to do so, however, 
Human Security will need to become post-secular. A “post-secular” conception 
of human security should, it is argued, permit the articulation of plural claims 
from a multiplicity of different religio-cultural traditions without prioritizing any 
one ‘tradition’ as having a monopoly over the definition of what it is to be 
‘human’ and what it is to be ‘secure’. Consequently, it contests the ontological 
underpinnings of both conventional understandings of Human Security and 
poses a sterner challenge to the hegemony of the national security paradigm.
In modern industrialized societies, a post-secular approach would aim at 
bringing in the voices of those who have remained marginalized by secular 
political discourse, particularly those of religious minorities. The aim of such 
approach, however, would not be to forcibly translate political claims emanating 
from a faith-based perspective into secular claims as Jürgen Habermas (2008) 
has suggested, but to try and understand faith-based claims in their own terms. 
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To understand, however, is not to accept. Claims which seek to exclude others 
on the grounds of ethnicity, religion, gender and sexual orientation are 
themselves sources of human insecurity in that they violate the ‘vital core’ of 
being. The advantage of a post-secular approach is that it acknowledges that 
secularism itself can be exclusionary and thus a source of insecurity for faith-
based communities. In the post-colonial world, however, the influence of 
colonial categories of religion has cast a shadow on what constitutes the ‘sacred’ 
and ‘profane’.
In the post-colonial world, the concept of ‘religion’ remains an important 
marker of difference. Religion was an imported cultural category imposed upon 
indigenous societies by the colonizing power as part of a regime of colonial 
governmentality (Chatterjee, 1993). For Tomoko Masuzawa, the rise of the 
modern social sciences allowed a distinction to be made between the modern, 
secular West and a mystical East depicted by Orientalist scholarship and 
historians of religion. Consequently, “every region of the non-modern non-West 
was presumed to be thoroughly in the grip of religion, as all aspects of life were 
supposedly determined and dictated by an archaic metaphysics of the magical 
and the supernatural” (Masuzawa, 2005, p. 16).  
Following Derrida (1998), it is argued that the Judeo-Christian conception 
of religio is based on a specific cultural tradition that is fundamentally 
unintelligible to other cultural traditions, yet at the same time it continues to 
profoundly influence non-western identities through the associated practices of 
(neo-)colonial governmentality. In particular, modern scientific techniques of 
classification and enumeration transformed the political landscape of the 
colonized world and continue to shape its politics today, transforming previously 
‘fuzzy’ and overlapping religious, cultural and political identities into 
‘enumerated’ religious communities through the Census. As Bernard Cohn 
points out, “what was entailed in the construction of census operations was the 
creation of social categories” by which colonial societies were ordered for 
administrative purposes (Cohn, 1996, p. 8). The Census objectified religious, 
social and cultural difference. In the case of colonial South Asia, the categories 
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of caste and religion became homogenous and mutually exclusive despite the 
‘fuzziness’ of caste and religious boundaries (Kaviraj, 2010). The result is that, 
for many in the post-colonial world, the concept of ‘religion’ continues to define 
subjectivity even though it is alien to the cultural traditions of pre-colonial 
societies. Religion ceased to be, to borrow Nandy’s terminology, a ‘faith’ and 
became an ‘ideology’: a ‘subnational, national or cross-national identifier of 
populations contesting for or protecting non-religious, usually political or socio-
economic interests’ (Nandy, 1998, p. 322). 
IV. Towards a Post-Western Understanding of Human Security?
In my understanding, a ‘post-western’ conception of human security should 
permit the articulation of plural claims from a multiplicity of different religio-
cultural traditions without prioritizing any one ‘tradition’ as having a monopoly 
over what is human security. Secular notions of Human Security, define security 
in terms of ‘freedom from fear and want’ and bring into being a universal 
community of humanity based on birth or our capacity to think which is thought 
to distinguish us from other sentient beings. However, the genealogy of modern 
conceptions of human rights and security lie in the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
The book of Genesis states, ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness’ 
(Gen. 1: 26-7). Consequently, Christians affirm that all human beings have a 
‘natural right’ to be treated equally since we are all created in the image of God 
(Imago Dei).(7) Although it could be argued that the end result is the same- equal 
entitlements to freedom from fear and want- individuals, in the Christian 
tradition, cannot be the ultimate source of agency and autonomy. Roman 
Catholicism in particular considers Imago Dei to be foundational and grounds its 
post-Vatican II defence of human rights in the concept. 
Similarly, Islam holds that security resides not in individual autonomy and 
rationality but in our equal submission to the divine will of Allah. Those who 
submit form the umma, the universal community of believers. Muslims hold the 
(7) Indeed, in the Christian tradition it is precisely God’s love (agape) which constitutes the 
subject. 
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Qu’ran to be the ultimate source of truth and relations between Muslims are 
regulated by Shar’ia Law. Space, however, is allocated in Islamic law for 
itjihad, independent judicial reasoning, and interpretation of the Quran. 
However, all Muslims, irrespective of sect(8), share five fundamental duties: first, 
all are expected to profess the Shahada, their faith that there is no God but Allah 
and that Mohammed is his Prophet; second Muslims should profess their faith 
through the Salat, a formal ritual prayer uttered five times a day; third, all 
Muslims are expected to observe the Sawm and fast during the holy month of 
Ramadan; fourth, all Muslims must give alms to the poor (Zakat) and; finally, all 
Muslims are expected to undertake the Hajj, a pilgrimage to Mecca. Faith, and 
therefore ontological security, comes from observance of these five ‘pillars’ of 
Islam (arkān al-Islām). 
Indic religio-cultural traditions, however, have a different cosmology from 
the Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam and lack a central 
revealed text such as the Qu’ran, Torah or Bible. In South Asia, the collection of 
local faiths subsumed under the term ‘Hinduism’ have as their central concern 
the concept of dharma. Dharma governs all legitimate world ends (purushartha), 
prescribing different rights and duties for different ‘castes.’(9) Ontological 
security resides in following one’s karma, the application of dharma to 
individual action. Karma in turn determines the cycle of birth, death and rebirth 
(samsara). Brahmans and other ‘twice-born’ castes have more ‘security’ than 
(8)
(9)
A distinction is commonly made in Islam between the orthodox Sunni and Shi’a Islam. The 
schism has its origins in the right of succession after the Prophet Muhammad’s death. The 
Shi’ia support the claims of the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, Ali, to have succeeded him 
rather than his eventual successor, Abu Bakr. Doctrinally, both Sunni and Shi’a rely upon 
different Hadith (textual traditions) but agree upon the centrality of the Qu’ran as the revealed 
text.
The term ‘caste’ is used to describe the Sanskrit term varna, which refers to an endogamous 
hereditary social group defined by notions of ‘purity’ and ‘pollution’ that have their origins in 
the ‘Hindu’ sacred texts, the Vedas. Society is divided into four varna: the Brahmans (priestly 
castes), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaishyas (famers) and Shudras (slaves). See Dirks (2001) for a 
discussion of the colonial construction of the ‘caste’ from Brahmanical accounts and 
Orientalist scholarship.
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those of other castes as they are nearer to achieving moksha (liberation from 
suffering). There is, therefore, in Hinduism, a ‘hierarchy of protection’ (Brekke, 
2013). In Buddhism as in Hinduism, dharma is seen as the provider of 
protection, and thus, ontological security rests with following one’s karma. 
However, nirvana (liberation from suffering) is possible through individual 
meditation or as part of a community, sangha. In Sikhism, dharam (a variant of 
dharma) guides action and liberation can be achieved through the recitation of 
the ‘true name’ (Satnaam). However, the communal aspect of religious identity 
is emphasized through the wearing of the five external symbols of faith making 
a distinction between the ‘religious’ community (Khalsa) and ‘nation’ (qaum) 
difficult (Shani, 2008a). Gender equality is particularly emphasized in Sikhism 
whereas Buddhism extends the principle of equality to all sentient beings while 
questioning the uniqueness of individual identity through the doctrine of 
anatman (no self). 
Although this discussion was necessarily brief and drawn almost exclusively 
from the traditions with which I am most familiar, it serves to ‘provincialize’ 
(Chakrabarty, 2000) secular conceptions of Human Security, and in so doing, 
illustrate the main point of this paper; that non-western religio-cultural traditions 
have different notions of human security which cannot be encompassed within a 
single universal conception of Human Security. 
Conclusion: Pluralizing Human Security
In conclusion, this paper argues that cultural identity remains an important 
component of human security in our post-global age. Culture, here, refers not to 
a set of all-engulfing, totalizing ‘primordial attachments’ (Geertz, 1963) but to 
that which permits the individual to enjoy a life endowed with meaning and 
dignity as part of a ‘community’ or collectivity. Consequently, any attempt to 
enhance human security globally must allow faith-based groups to live in 
accordance with their beliefs without being forced to assimilate to the seemingly 
‘secular’ values of the state and ‘international community’. The project of 
‘critical human security’ can only be furthered, not by a commitment to ‘security 
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as emancipation’ (Booth 1991; Newman, 2010) but by engaging with cultural 
traditions that offer alternative understandings of the ‘human’ and ‘security’ than 
those of secular, liberal modernity.
For the project of ‘human security’ to be advanced globally, it will need to 
be based upon multiple culturally-grounded conceptions of the ‘human’, 
freedom and security rather than a priori assumptions of a single, universalizable 
‘secular’ human nature which subsumes cultural difference in its totalizing 
desire for emancipation from ‘fear’ and ‘want’. For human security to aspire to 
‘universality’, it needs to be both ‘post-western’ and ‘post-secular’. In so doing, 
it may well contribute to a ‘global civilizing process’ capable of transcending – 
if not dismantling— the pernicious binaries between the ‘civilized’ and 
‘barbaric,’ ‘secular’ and ‘religious’, ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ and the ‘West’ 
and the ‘rest’ which have “blocked the expansion of an international society 
consisting of moral equals” (Linklater, forthcoming, this volume).
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<Summary>
Giorgio Shani 
This paper seeks to critically interrogate the view that the emergence of ‘hu-
man security’ can be seen as a manifestation of what Norbert Elias aptly termed 
the ‘civilizing process’. Despite its recent adoption by the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly in September 2012 and its institutionalization through the United 
Nations system, Human Security may be viewed –not only in its ‘narrow’ but also 
its ‘broad’ guises—as the latest instantiation of the ‘civilizing mission’ facilitating 
the continued intervention of the western-dominated ‘international community’ in 
previously colonized areas of the world. Critically reworked, however, human 
security has the potential to constitute a powerful ‘global ethic’ by distancing it-
self from its western ‘secular’ origins and recognizing the multiple religio-cultur-
al contexts in which human dignity is embedded.

